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HAVING ITS YELLOWCAKE AND EATING IT 
TOO: HOW THE NSG WAIVER FOR INDIA 
THREATENS TO UNDERMINE THE 
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Benjamin Wastler* 
Abstract: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a cartel of nuclear sup-
pliers that imposes export restrictions on nuclear trade with states that do 
not adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) or submit to safeguards administered by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The NSG passed a waiver of restrictions on nu-
clear commerce with India in September 2008 despite India’s failure to 
meet either of these nonproliferation norms. This waiver, largely influ-
enced by the economic and political motivations of large nuclear suppli-
ers, establishes a double standard for India because it provides India with 
the same trade benefits of NPT members but without the nonprolifera-
tion obligations. This Note argues that the NSG waiver threatens to un-
dermine the NPT and global security at-large. The Note proposes ways to 
narrow the scope of the waiver to prevent further damage to the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. 
Introduction 
 On September 6, 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a car-
tel which regulates exports of nuclear fuel and technology, passed a 
waiver lifting a thirty-year ban on nuclear trade with India.1 The waiver 
marks an unprecedented departure from thirty years of refusal to en-
gage in nuclear trade with states such as India that are not parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and do not 
place their nuclear industries under safeguards operated by the Inter-
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1See Quantum Politics, Economist, Sept. 13, 2008, at 48, available at http://www.econ- 
omist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12209404. 
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national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).2 The United States lobbied 
heavily to gain exception for India from NSG rules in order to effectu-
ate the nuclear exchange agreement negotiated by U.S. President 
George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005.3 
Several other exporting states, eager to meet India’s burgeoning energy 
demands, are negotiating similar nuclear agreements with India.4 
 Although the NSG waiver will likely benefit both India and nuclear 
exporters, it will severely undermine the NPT, which for forty years has 
served as the linchpin of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.5 The 
NPT is essentially a bargain between nuclear weapons states and non-
nuclear weapons states.6 Non-nuclear weapons states agree not to de-
velop nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear weapons states’ com-
mitment to share technology for peaceful purposes and to gradually 
disarm their nuclear arsenals.7 The NSG was created in the aftermath 
of India’s 1974 testing of a nuclear weapon developed with nuclear 
technology transferred by major nuclear suppliers for peaceful pur-
poses.8 The NSG established guidelines in 1975 to ensure that the states 
that failed to sign the NPT—India, Pakistan, and Israel—were excluded 
from the benefits of nuclear trade.9 The NSG waiver for India, however, 
diminishes the non-nuclear weapons states’ incentive to belong to the 
NPT.10 India now receives the same benefits of nuclear trade that NPT 
parties do but is not required to sign the NPT, to relinquish its nuclear 
weapons, or to adhere to the other provisions of the treaty.11 The 
                                                                                                                      
2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 
729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]; see A Legacy Project, Economist, Sept. 13, 2008, at 49, 
available at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12209631. 
3 Quantum Politics, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
4 Erika Kinetz, India Open to Nuclear Business with France, Russia, Livemint, Sept. 26, 2008, 
http://www.livemint.com/2008/09/26220917/India-open-to-nuclear-business.html?d=1. 
5 A Legacy Project, supra note 2, at 49. 
6 See NPT, supra note 2, arts. II–VI. 
7 Id. 
8 See Marvin Miller & Lawrence Scheinman, Israel, India, and Pakistan: Engaging the 
Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime, 33 Arms Control Today 15, 16 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman. 
9 See Daniel Horner, G-8 Tightens Nuclear Export Rules, 39 Arms Control Today 33, 33 
(2009), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_09/G8; George Perkovich, Dir., 
Nuclear Pol’y Program, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, A Realist Case for Condition-
ing the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, Address at a Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 
(May 15, 2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index. 
cfm?fa=view&id=18371. 
10 Perkovich, supra note 9. 
11 Glenn Kessler, Senate Backs Far-Reaching Nuclear Trade Deal with India, Wash. Post, Oct. 
2, 2008, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 
10/01/AR2008100100533.html. 
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breakdown of the NPT could have dire implications for the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and for global security.12 
 Part I of this Note discusses the history of the nonproliferation 
movement with emphasis on the origins of the NPT and the NSG. In 
addition, this section highlights India’s relationship vis-à-vis the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and provides context for the United States’ 
pursuit of a nuclear agreement with India. Part II examines the frame-
work of the NPT and the NSG’s role in protecting the exclusivity of the 
benefits of NPT membership. This section also identifies how the NSG 
waiver for India may now undermine these NPT benefits. Lastly, Part III 
addresses the need for the nuclear nonproliferation regime to engage 
non-NPT states and evaluates the adequacy of the NSG waiver in doing 
so. This section then predicts the impact that the NSG waiver will have 
on the effectiveness of the NPT and suggests ways to mitigate the dam-
age to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
I. Background 
A. “Atoms for Peace” and the Birth of the Nonproliferation Movement 
 When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, he faced the diffi-
cult task of managing the global spread of nuclear weapons.13 At that 
time, only the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union had 
successfully developed nuclear weapons.14 Many other states, however, 
sought to acquire the sophisticated technology required to build nu-
clear weapons or generate nuclear energy for civilian use.15 Eisenhower 
faced the choice of either concealing U.S. nuclear technology or shar-
ing it with other states for peaceful energy-generating purposes on the 
condition that they promise not to divert the technology to develop 
nuclear weapons.16 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Saira Yamin, The U.S., India and the Elusive 123 Deal, Foreign Pol’y in Focus, 
Sept. 7, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4528. 
13 Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. President, Address to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly (Dec. 8, 1953). 
14 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of History & Heritage Resources, The Manhattan 
Project: An Interactive History, http://www.cfo.doe.gov/me70/manhattan/proliferation.htm 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
15 Peter R. Lavoy, The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace, 33 Arms Control Today 26, 
29 (2003), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Lavoy. 
16 Id. 
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 Opting for the latter course, Eisenhower collaborated with other 
nuclear supplier states to create the “Atoms for Peace” program.17 
Through this initiative, nuclear supplier states assisted non-nuclear 
weapons states in building nuclear reactors.18 In addition, “Atoms for 
Peace” created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an 
independent agency that reports to the United Nations,19 to enforce 
safeguards to prevent recipient states from diverting acquired technol-
ogy to build nuclear weapons.20 Although some herald “Atoms for 
Peace” as a successful multilateral effort to stem widespread nuclear 
proliferation, critics claim that it actually accelerated nuclear prolifera-
tion.21 India, Pakistan, and Israel each diverted assistance received 
through “Atoms for Peace” to develop nuclear weapons.22 
B. The NPT and India’s Non-Adherence 
 Largely modeled on “Atoms for Peace,”23 the NPT opened for sig-
nature in 1968.24 Today, 190 countries in the world are parties to the 
treaty.25 The treaty recognizes the five states that had developed nuclear 
weapons prior to 1967 as nuclear weapons states26—the United States, 
Russia, Great Britain, France, and China27—and requires that these 
states gradually disarm their nuclear arsenals and share technology to 
assist non-nuclear weapons states in building nuclear reactors for 
peaceful energy-generating purposes.28 All other states are recognized 
as non-nuclear weapons states and are prohibited from developing or 
acquiring nuclear weapons.29 
                                                                                                                      
17 Zia Mian & Alexander Glaser, A Frightening Nuclear Legacy, 64 Bull. Atomic Scien-
tists 42, 42 (2008). 
18 Id. 
19 International Atomic Energy Agency, The “Atoms for Peace” Agency, http://www. 
iaea.org/About/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
20 Lavoy, supra note 15, at 27–29. 
21 Id. at 26. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 29. 
24 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2010). 
25 Id. 
26 NPT, supra note 2, art. IX. 
27 Federation of American Scientists, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wea-
pons, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
28 NPT, supra note 2, arts. IV–VI. 
29 Id. art. II. 
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 India is one of four states in the world that is not a member of the 
treaty.30 While India, Israel, and Pakistan never signed the treaty, North 
Korea withdrew in 2003 because it sought to develop nuclear weap-
ons.31 India refused to sign the treaty largely because it sought a nu-
clear deterrent to stave off threats from its neighbors Pakistan and Chi-
na, with which India has enduring border disputes.32 Moreover, India 
objected to the lack of an ethical rationale for the distinction between 
nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.33 
C. The Role of the NSG in the Nonproliferation Regime 
 The NSG was formed in 1975 to “clamp down” on abuse of nuclear 
technology provided for commercial purposes but converted into nu-
clear weapons programs.34 The group was created in response to India’s 
1974 test of a nuclear weapon constructed with technology acquired 
under “Atoms for Peace.”35 The test revealed that non-weapons specific 
nuclear assistance could be readily converted into weapons develop-
ment programs.36 The NSG placed an embargo on nuclear trade on all 
states that had failed to sign the NPT until they accepted the full-scope 
IAEA safeguards that the NPT requires.37 
 The NSG waiver for India is ironic because it exempts India from 
the rules originally designed for it.38 The embargo was intended to pe-
nalize India for its abuse of nuclear technology provided for peaceful 
purposes and to deprive it of the substantial benefits of nuclear trade.39 
Indeed, India’s fledgling nuclear industry has suffered from the em-
bargo because India lacks an abundance of uranium deposits and 
therefore depends on trade to accumulate the materials necessary for 
                                                                                                                      
30 Federation of American Scientists, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wea-
pons, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
31 Id. 
32 Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Sec. Studies, Ctr. for Policy Research in New Dehli, 
The India-Pakistan-China Strategic Triangle and the Role of Nuclear Weapons, Address at 
l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales Seminar (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http:// 
www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=4218&id_provenance=97. 
33 Munish Puri, India and the NPT—A Nuclear Existential Dilemma, Inst. for Peace & 
Conflict Stud., May 6, 2005, http://ipcs.org/article/india/india-and-the-npt-a-nuclear-
existential-dilemma-1731.html. 
34 Miller & Scheinman, supra note 8, at 16. 
35 Quantum Politics, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
36 See Nuclear Suppliers Group, History of the NSG, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup. 
org/history.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
37 Id. 
38 Quantum Politics, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
39 See id. 
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nuclear fission.40 Moreover, India’s failure to develop a robust nuclear 
industry has exacerbated its current energy crisis.41 Thus, the timing of 
the waiver is puzzling considering that it was granted at precisely the 
moment when the embargo is having its intended effect.42 
D. Factors Underlying the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement 
 The United States lobbied heavily and overcame resistance by var-
ious NSG suppliers to gain exception for India from NSG rules.43 Be-
cause the NSG operates by consensus, even one dissenting state could 
block a measure.44 Austria, New Zealand, and Ireland initially objected 
to the NSG waiver for India on the ground that it would set a danger-
ous precedent by rewarding India’s abuse of acquired nuclear technol-
ogy.45 Despite their reservations, these states ultimately yielded to the 
interests of states with heavier diplomatic clout and vested economic 
interests in the waiver, such as Russia and France.46 
 There are several reasons why the United States was willing to 
“bring its diplomatic muscle to bear on India’s behalf.”47 Most impor-
tantly, it believes that the nuclear agreement will forge a strategic alli-
ance with India which will serve to counterbalance the region’s other 
emerging power, China.48 Although President Bush may have pressed 
for the deal primarily in order to bolster his Presidential “legacy”49 with 
the achievement of strengthening Indo-American relations, the nuclear 
agreement nevertheless received overwhelming support in both houses 
of Congress.50 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. 
41 See Carin Zissis, India’s Energy Crunch, Council on Foreign Rel., Oct. 23, 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12200/indias_energy_crunch.html. 
42 See Charles Ferguson, Reshaping the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal to Lessen the Nonproliferation 
Losses, 38 Arms Control Today 15, 15–18 (2008), available at http://www.armscontrol. 
org/act/2008_04/Ferguson. 
43 Quantum Politics, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
44 Wade Boese, NSG, Congress Approve Nuclear Trade with India, 38 Arms Control To-
day 27, 28 (2008), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/NSGapprove. 
45 See U.S.-India Nuclear Accord Approved, BBC News, Sept. 6, 2008, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7601932.stm. 
46 See Boese, supra note 44, at 28. 
47 Quantum Politics, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
48 Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S.-India Nuclear Deal Clears First Hurdle, Fin. Times (London) 
Sept. 28, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bdff77de-8d7f-11dd-83d5–0000779fd18c.html. 
49 A Legacy Project, supra note 2, at 49. 
50 See Boese, supra note 44, at 28. The House of Representatives approved the nuclear 
deal 298 to 117 on Sept. 27, 2008, and the Senate approved the deal 86 to 13 on Oct. 1, 
2008. Id. 
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 Furthermore, proponents of the agreement claim that it officially 
brings India into the nonproliferation fold and rewards India for its 
voluntary nonproliferation commitment over the last thirty years.51 In 
spite of its non-adherence to the NPT, India has abided by many non-
proliferation norms.52 For instance, India has voluntarily adopted the 
strict export regulations of the NSG and refused to share nuclear tech-
nology with rogue states such as North Korea, something which cannot 
be said of neighboring Pakistan.53 India has also imposed a strict safe-
guards regime on its own nuclear facilities and criminalized the trade 
and brokering of sensitive nuclear technology.54 
 Finally, supporters of the deal justify the NSG waiver as a necessary 
means of combating global climate change.55 India is the world’s fifth 
largest consumer of energy, but nuclear energy amounts to only three 
percent of its total output.56 India’s energy consumption will continue 
to rise as its economy expands.57 A transition from dependence on fos-
sil fuels to nuclear energy will allow India to reduce its carbon footprint 
because generating nuclear energy produces no carbon emissions.58 
II. Discussion 
A. The NPT Framework 
 The NPT rests on three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, 
and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.59 Signatory members’ com-
mitment to nonproliferation is found in Articles I, II, and III of the 
treaty.60 Article I prohibits the five nuclear weapons states from trans-
ferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states or assisting or 
encouraging them in any way to manufacture nuclear weapons.61 Crit-
ics of the NSG waiver claim that nuclear trade with India violates weap-
                                                                                                                      
51 See Esther Pan & Jayshree Bajoria, The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, Council on Foreign 
Rel., Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 William S. Cohen, Op-Ed., The India Nuclear Deal: The Merits, Forbes, Sept. 30, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/30/india-nuclear-senate-oped-cx_wc_0930cohen.html. 
56 See Zissis, supra note 41. 
57 See id. 
58 Cohen, supra note 55. 
59 Jenny Nielsen, Engaging India, Israel and Pakistan in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Re-
gime, 86 Disarmament Dipl. 13, 14 (2007), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/ 
dd86/86jn.htm. 
60 NPT, supra note 2, arts. I–III. 
61 Id. art. I. 
208 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 33:201 
ons states’ Article I obligations because it assists India’s nuclear weap-
ons program.62 Although the NSG waiver prohibits India from using 
imported nuclear technology for weapons-producing purposes, the 
flow of uranium imports for civilian reactors will free up more of In-
dia’s domestic uranium for weapons-grade enrichment.63 Whether this 
indirect aid to India’s nuclear weapons industry constitutes assistance 
in violation of Article I of the NPT remains an open question.64 
 Meanwhile, Article II provides that non-nuclear weapons states 
may not receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons and must 
submit to IAEA safeguards to prevent them from diverting civilian nu-
clear resources to build nuclear weapons.65 Abandoning nuclear weap-
ons ambitions was a serious decision for many states, especially those 
with nuclear weapons capabilities.66 Ultimately though, these states 
concluded that assistance for civilian nuclear programs outweighed the 
military utility or prestige of nuclear weapons.67 
 In Article VI of the treaty, nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear 
weapons states agree to “pursue negotiations in good faith on disar-
mament measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament.”68 The vagueness of this provi-
sion’s language has allowed weapons states to justify retention of their 
nuclear arsenals.69 Nevertheless, the United States and Russia, which 
possess the largest nuclear arsenals by far, have substantially reduced 
the size of their stockpiles.70 Disarmament is inextricably linked to 
nonproliferation because weapons states will never fully disarm until 
they are confident that nuclear proliferation does not threaten their 
security.71 
                                                                                                                      
62 Pan & Bajoria, supra note 51. 
63 Id. 
64 See Ashley J. Tellis, Atoms for War? U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s 
Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, June 2006, http://www.carnegie 
endowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf (analyzing whether the United States’ assis-
tance to India constitutes a violation of Article I of the NPT). 
65 NPT, supra note 2, art. III. 
66 Interview by Renee Montagne with Mitchell Reiss, Senior Assoc., Ctr. for Strategic & 
Int’l Studies, in Culver City, CA (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 17, 2006), available at http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5345504. 
67 Id. 
68 NPT, supra note 2, art. IV. 
69 See Q&A: Nuclear Disarmament, BBC News, Dec. 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/in_depth/6103398.stm. 
70 Id. 
71 See Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Remarks at United 
Nations Brainstorming Session on Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Breaking the Sta-
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 Article IV of the treaty discusses members’ inalienable right to use 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.72 Article V further provides that 
nuclear technology must be shared on a “non-discriminatory basis.”73 
Most non-nuclear weapons states signed the NPT under the assumption 
that peaceful nuclear assistance would be exclusive to signatory mem-
bers of the treaty.74 The opening of nuclear trade with India, however, 
exposes a flaw of the NPT: no provision prohibits nuclear supplier 
states from providing civilian nuclear assistance to states outside the 
treaty.75 Without such exclusivity rights, it is unclear why a non-nuclear 
weapons state would continue to remain a party to the treaty.76 
 Significantly, Article X allows a party to the treaty the right to with-
draw if “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this trea-
ty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country,” as long as it 
gives three months notice.77 North Korea, which withdrew from the 
treaty in 2003, three years before it tested its first nuclear weapon, is the 
only country to exercise this provision.78 Although the withdrawal pro-
vision has historically not been a threat to the sustained vitality of the 
NPT, the commencement of nuclear trade with a non-adherent state 
such as India may give some countries reason to question their contin-
ued NPT membership and to consider withdrawal.79 
B. The Implications of the NSG Waiver 
 Since its inception in 1975, the NSG has excluded non-NPT mem-
bers who refuse to submit to IAEA safeguards from the benefits of nu-
                                                                                                                      
lemate (Aug. 11, 2007), available at http://disarmament.un.org/speech/duarte11082007. 
htm. 
72 NPT, supra note 2, art. IV. 
73 Id. art. V. 
74 See Daryl Kimball, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance, Arms Con-
trol Ass’n, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
75 See Paul Reynolds, Nuclear Weapons: Can They Be Stopped?, BBC News, Sept. 22, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3680418.stm. 
76 See Pavel Padvig, A Silver Lining to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, Bull. Atomic Scien-
tists, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/a- 
silver-lining-to-the-us-india-nuclear-deal. 
77 NPT, supra note 2, art. X. 
78 See Daryl Kimball, Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, Arms 
Control Ass’n, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron (last visited Mar. 15, 
2010). 
79 See Ashton B. Carter, How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love India’s Bomb, 
Foreign Aff., Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ (enter article title in search 
box; then follow hyperlink). 
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clear trade.80 The NSG, therefore, fills the gap in the NPT that threat-
ened to diminish the non-nuclear weapons states’ imperative to remain 
members.81 The NSG waiver for India, however, reopens this fissure in 
the NPT by undermining the exclusivity of rights to nuclear trade it 
once protected.82 Some question whether the waiver is the beginning of 
a slippery slope of exemption for current or potential proliferators.83 
 Granted, the NSG is not likely to provide another waiver in the 
near term.84 The other three non-adherent states—Israel, Pakistan, and 
North Korea—are much more at odds with the nonproliferation re-
gime.85 Israel, for instance, shrouds its nuclear arsenal in secrecy and 
does not formally acknowledge it for fear of provoking a nuclear arms 
race in the Middle East.86 Granting a similar waiver to Israel would sure-
ly infuriate Israel’s enemies in the region who have abided by their 
nonproliferation obligations.87 Pakistan, meanwhile, has lost credibility 
with the nonproliferation regime because of its sharing of nuclear se-
crets with rogue states such as North Korea and Iran.88 Likewise, North 
Korea is unlikely to obtain such a waiver because of its past defiance of 
NPT obligations.89 Prior to its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003, North 
Korea repeatedly reneged on its promises not to use nuclear technol-
ogy for weapons-producing purposes and frequently denied IAEA in-
spectors access to its nuclear facilities.90 
 Moreover, the NSG waiver for India includes several conditions 
intended to limit the damage to the nonproliferation regime.91 These 
conditions include: India’s formal pledge to sustain its voluntary mora-
torium on nuclear testing; India’s adoption of NSG guidelines regard-
ing nuclear export restrictions; and India’s acceptance of IAEA safe-
                                                                                                                      
80 See Daryl Kimball, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a Glance, Arms Control Ass’n, 
May 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG . 
81 See Daryl Kimball, Text, Analysis, and Response to NSG “Statement on Civil Nuclear Coopera-
tion with India,” Arms Control Ass’n, Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3345. 
82 See id. 
83 Miller & Scheinman, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
84 See Nicholas Burns, Former Undersecretary of State for Pol. Aff., Remarks at Brook-
ings Institution Panel Discussion: The U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement ( July 30, 2008), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0730_india.aspx. 
85 See Miller & Scheinman, supra note 8, 16–19. 
86 Id. 
87 Nielsen, supra note 59, at 14. 
88 See Miller & Scheinman, supra note 8, at 18. 
89 See id. 
90 Kongdan Oh & Ralph Hassig, North Korea: A Rogue State Outside the NPT Fold, Brook-
ings Inst. Foreign Pol’y Agenda, Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/ 
0301northkorea_hassig.aspx. 
91 See Kimball, supra note 81. 
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guards on several of its nuclear facilities.92 In theory, these conditions 
serve to “bring India into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream” 
and to justify the NSG’s exceptional treatment of India.93 
 Nevertheless, the NSG waiver for India may prompt several NPT 
members to consider withdrawing from the treaty.94 Iran, widely sus-
pected to be covertly developing nuclear weapons, may argue that it is 
even more entitled to relief from nonproliferation rules because, un-
like India, it has adhered to the NPT since its creation.95 Other states 
that have kept clean nonproliferation records despite nuclear weapons 
capabilities may infer from the India precedent that if they withdraw 
from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons, the NSG would gradually 
accommodate them too.96 In the near term, states in volatile regions 
such as Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and Egypt may initiate nascent fis-
sile material production for bomb-making purposes as a means of 
hedging their bets.97 
III. Analysis 
A. The Urgency and Delicacy of Engaging the Non-NPT States 
 As several commentators have expressed, there is an urgent need 
for the nonproliferation regime to engage states that do not adhere to 
the NPT.98 The nuclear weapons capabilities of these states affect the 
regional security of NPT members.99 The presence of nuclear weapons 
in India and Pakistan reinforces China’s need for a nuclear deterrent 
while Israel’s nuclear arsenal fuels Iran’s pursuit of one.100 Meanwhile, 
all NPT members fret that the non-adherent states will disseminate nu-
clear weapons technology to rogue states or terrorists.101 Lack of uni-
versality in nonproliferation agreements and looming nonproliferation 
threats stymie disarmament talks and further weaken the NPT.102 
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 Because it is unforeseeable that the non-adherent states will relin-
quish their nuclear weapons and sign the NPT, some experts suggest 
alternative ways to obtain nonproliferation commitments.103 One im-
portant means of engagement would be to acquire their signature to 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).104 Testing nuclear weap-
ons is the only reliable way to ensure their readiness for deployment in 
a military encounter.105 Absent nuclear weapons tests, it may be less 
likely that states would use them.106 Another important step for non-
proliferation would be the non-adherent states’ adoption of the Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).107 The FMCT would ban the produc-
tion of any additional fissile material that could be used to produce nu-
clear weapons.108 Any engagement of outlier states must proceed care-
fully because making large concessions may erode the value of the 
nonproliferation commitments of the NPT members.109 
 The NSG waiver for India fails to bring India into the nonprolif-
eration fold and enacts lasting damage on the nonproliferation re-
gime.110 Most significantly, the waiver severely undermines the NPT and 
may provoke several non-weapons states to withdraw and to institute 
nuclear weapons programs.111 This result would be devastating not only 
for the nonproliferation regime but also for global security at-large.112 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of more states in-
creases the scenarios in which nuclear weapons plausibly may be 
used.113 This increased utility of nuclear weapons will fuel arms races 
and lead to a breakdown of collective security arrangements.114 
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B. Balancing the Costs and Benefits of the NSG Waiver 
 The nonproliferation commitments India made to obtain the NSG 
waiver are “not in any way equivalent to the legal obligations and com-
mitments made by the members states of the NPT.”115 The waiver ac-
knowledges India’s promise to separate its civilian reactors from its mil-
itary reactors and to place all existing civilian reactors under IAEA 
safeguards.116 This is a “major step,” some experts say, because the non-
proliferation regime has formerly failed to induce India to accept any 
international safeguards on its nuclear facilities.117 India’s commitment, 
however, does not include future nuclear facilities.118 Indian Prime Mi-
nister, Manmohan Singh, insists that India reserves the right to deter-
mine whether future reactors, either civilian or military, are subject to 
IAEA safeguards.119 
 The NSG waiver also fails to clarify whether supplier states can sus-
pend nuclear trade with India if it resumes testing nuclear weapons.120 
Although the waiver recognizes India’s formal pledge to continue its 
voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, India maintains that it retains 
the “right to undertake future tests, if it is necessary.”121 Most supplier 
states will likely suspend nuclear trade with India should it resume test-
ing, but the waiver should have established clear sanctions for India in 
such a scenario.122 
 Another shortcoming of the waiver is that it does not limit India’s 
future production of weapons-grade fissile material.123 This commit-
ment would have been a significant victory for the nonproliferation 
regime since all nuclear weapons states except China are taking steps to 
limit their production of fissile material.124 It is likewise lamentable that 
the safeguards imposed on India’s civilian reactors will not apply to the 
fissile material produced prior to India’s nuclear agreement with the 
United States.125 
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 Unlike NPT members, India has made no formal commitment to 
disarmament.126 Given that disarmament ultimately requires the uni-
versal commitment of nuclear weapons states, India’s recalcitrance will 
continue to hamper the disarmament movement, already the weakest 
pillar of the NPT.127 India’s continued buildup of nuclear weapons may 
spark a nuclear arms race with China and Pakistan, which would fur-
ther destabilize an already combustible region.128 
 To be sure, the NSG waiver does harmonize India’s nuclear export 
restrictions with those of the NSG.129 Bringing India’s export control 
system in line with the NSG will help quell the fears of those who worry 
about the transfer of sensitive nuclear weapons technology to rogue 
states or terrorists.130 Nevertheless, this commitment hardly brings In-
dia further into the nonproliferation fold because India already had a 
rigorous export control system with which nonproliferation experts 
were largely satisfied.131 The NSG likely could have exacted more sig-
nificant concessions from India in light of its immediate energy crisis.132 
By opening nuclear trade with India and permitting it to possess and to 
build nuclear weapons, the NSG is essentially allowing India to have its 
yellowcake and eat it too.133 
C. The Impact of the NSG Waiver on the NPT 
 The NSG waiver undercuts the NPT because it “devalues the re-
straint” the non-nuclear weapons states of the NPT have exercised in 
forsaking nuclear weapons.134 Many of these states are beginning to 
question their allegiance to a nonproliferation regime that rewards In-
dia’s “obstinacy” and enhances its “status” in the process.135 In attempt-
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ing to court NPT outlier states into the larger nonproliferation fold, the 
NSG has effectively alienated many NPT members.136 States with nu-
clear capabilities in volatile regions may strongly consider withdrawing 
from the NPT, initiating nuclear weapons programs, and playing the 
waiting game for accommodation from the nonproliferation regime.137 
 For instance, Iran is enriching weapons-grade uranium, and some 
believe it will soon develop its first nuclear weapon.138 The sustained 
U.S. military presence on its eastern and western borders and its persis-
tent hostility towards Israel are likely to spur its pursuit of a nuclear de-
terrent.139 The NSG waiver for India weakens the moral force of any 
argument against Iran obtaining nuclear weapons because it implicitly 
recognizes India’s right to possess them despite breaking nonprolifera-
tion rules in acquiring them.140 
 Even states with clean nonproliferation records may reconsider 
their nuclear options now that the primary benefit of NPT membership, 
access to peaceful nuclear energy, has been extended to non-NPT 
members.141 States in volatile regions such as Japan, South Korea, Egypt, 
and Turkey may wonder whether they too can attain access to nuclear 
trade, but from outside the NPT.142 Since North Korea’s successful nu-
clear test in 2006, Japan and South Korea feel increasingly vulnerable 
despite being under the U.S. security umbrella.143 The United States’ 
failure to prevent a nuclear-armed North Korea and its shifting of alli-
ances between Pakistan and India in South Asia have begun to under-
mine its credibility as a reliable ally in Asia.144 Iran’s defection from the 
NPT would be damaging to the NPT, but the withdrawal of a state with a 
clean nonproliferation record like Japan would be crippling.145 
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 Of course, it is unlikely that the NSG waiver will provoke a mass 
exodus from the NPT.146 Nuclear weapons are very expensive to build, 
yet they provide little military utility.147 The devastating impact of the 
atomic bombs dropped over Japan contributed to the nuclear taboo 
that has formed against using them.148 Despite its nuclear standoff with 
Pakistan, even India has adopted a nuclear “no first use policy.”149 In 
addition, many states would not take the gamble of withdrawing from 
the NPT because they might not gain an NSG waiver.150 Few states have 
energy markets near the size of India’s and would not attract the level 
of interest that India did among nuclear suppliers.151 
 Nevertheless, nuclear weapons are still largely believed to bestow 
“great power” prestige upon their possessors.152 Iran, which views itself 
as a great civilization, pursues nuclear weapons capabilities with the 
“widespread and enthusiastic” support of its people.153 Possessing a nu-
clear weapon may deter a larger state with much more advanced mili-
tary forces from invading.154 The threat of developing nuclear weapons 
has been used as a bargaining chip by North Korea to attain aid from 
the international community to ensure regime survival.155 Some states 
may determine that acquiring a military “equalizer” or garnering re-
spect or attention at home or abroad is worth the risk of temporary 
alienation in the nonproliferation regime.156 
D. Mitigating the Damage to the Nonproliferation Regime 
 To prevent the complete breakdown of the NPT, the NSG should 
narrow the scope of its waiver for India as much as possible.157 First, the 
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NSG should clarify that any additional nuclear testing would necessitate 
a complete suspension of nuclear trade with India.158 Permitting India 
to get away with conduct that the 180 signatories of the CTBT con-
demn would weaken an international norm that has gradually built 
strength in the last few decades.159 Second, the NSG should require that 
any future bilateral agreements make all current and future Indian nu-
clear reactors subject to IAEA safeguards.160 Such a requirement would 
nullify the loophole in the U.S.-India nuclear agreement that permits 
India to designate future reactors as civilian or military.161 Accordingly, 
India’s weapons-making capacities and ability to stockpile fissile mate-
rial would be curtailed.162 Finally, the NSG should limit all reprocessing 
and enrichment transfers of nuclear material to NPT members, which 
would exclude India.163 This measure would deprive India of the op-
portunity to divert sensitive “dual-use” technology for weapons-
producing purposes against its promises, as it has done in the past.164 
Conclusion 
 The damage is done. The NSG waiver has permanently discredited 
both the NSG and the NPT, which, along with the IAEA, have been the 
bulwarks of the nonproliferation regime. By creating a double standard 
for India, the NSG flouted its own rules and undermined the exclusive 
rights to nuclear energy that NPT members formerly enjoyed. Contrary 
to the claims of proponents of the NSG waiver for India, it fails to bring 
India into the nonproliferation fold and alienates the NPT members 
that have abided by their nonproliferation commitments. Several of 
these states may withdraw from the treaty and develop their own nuclear 
arsenals. Such a result would trigger the unraveling of the nonprolifera-
tion regime and threaten global security. Alas, the only action that can 
now be taken is for the NSG to narrow the scope of its waiver for India 
to limit further damage to the NPT and the nonproliferation regime. 
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